Theatropoiesis and novels of truth by Szakolczai, Árpád
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For if the intrusion of the real has disconcerted and 
incommoded the poetic, that is a mere bagatelle 
compared to the damage which the poetic would inflict 
if it ever succeeded in intruding upon the real. 
W.H. Auden, The Sea and the Mirror: A commentary on 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest, p.157 
 
L’irrationel limite le rationel qui lui donne à son tour sa 
mesure (The irrational limits the rational that on its 
turn gives it its measure) 
Camus, L’homme révolté, p.365 
 
Introduction: A question of balance 
 
I must start by giving reasons, almost an excuse, for such a strange title word. 
Over the past five years or so my research increasingly became focused on masks 
and theatre, and the long-term in-depth impact of related practices on social life. Such an 
orientation might seems perplexing, odd, idiosyncratic, as in our world nobody ever 
wears masks, except children for Halloween, while going to theatre became a fringe 
activity of an increasingly smaller number of people. It also took for me quite some time 
to recognise the potential significance of such a path, after it has been suggested to me 
by Agnes, with her usual graceful force. But by now I came to recognise that it indeed 
offers a royal road into the most pressing issues of the modern world – and not only. As 
the reality in which we live, and which we are forced to take for granted as the alpha and 
omega of our daily existence, as we do not have another one, is an increasingly 
theatricalised world. 
In order to understand the nature of theatricalisation, we need to enter a very 
basic anthropological level; a question, however, that is not concerned with the single 
human being, but with all of us living in this global world, and is therefore also in this 
sense political. Any moment of human life, in any aspect of our existence, is caught in a 
tension between two poles: the simple, repetitive ordinariness of everyday existence; and 
the mystery of being. We can only lead a happy, satisfied, rewarding life if things are 
ordered, predictable, and meaningful for us; if we have an understanding of and control 
over the simple, normal events of our everyday existence. There is no meaningful life 
outside a shared ordinariness. And yet, every moment of our existence is also saturated 
with mysteries, which can be revealed to us, shining suddenly upon us, in the midst of 
the most ordinary aspects of life and existence which otherwise we could just pass by of 
accept without thinking about it. The laughter of a child, the jumping of a dog on a small 
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meadow, the leaves of the autumn tree in a garden in front of the office window, or the 
hardly noticeable saluting expression on the face of two strangers who meet each other 
on a pathway carry a mystery which would take pages to describe – yet, to which no 
effort of a no matter how comprehensive description could do justice.1 The value of life 
is given by the most mundane everyday occurrences that can suddenly become filled with 
meaning – or, rather, which are always full of meaning, except that we don’t and cannot 
recognise, or pay them attention, all the time. The question of balance alluded to in the 
section title refers to such necessary balance between the everyday and the mysterious – a 
balance that is captured, in a more ‘institutionalised’ way, in the alternation of the 
ordinary and the out-of-ordinary, the Weberian ausseralltägliche, or between the sacred and 
the profane. 
 If the balance is broken, life – whether suddenly, or eventually – loses its 
meaning. On one pole, it becomes a wretched everyday drudgery of performing the same 
old mechanical gestures in order to make ends meet, in desperate search for any 
entertainment that would make one forget the boredom of everyday ‘normality’ (notice 
that the term ‘normal’ here assumes a purely statistical and legal meaning, in opposition 
to the meaningful stability it had before – much of the ‘postmodern’ discussion of the 
‘normal’ is based on a systematic ignorance of this difference); on the other hand, the 
infinite and inexhaustible mystery of Being is replaced by the supposed ‘demystification’ 
of every single human act – a child is only laughing at you because he wants some food 
or existential security; and love is nothing but the satisfaction of bodily functions, hardly 
different from other such functions, as the ancient Cynics already discussed and 
demonstrated this in detail, well before the ‘revolutionary’ ideas of Freud. 
 Theatre, understood as a non-participatory and non-sacred quasi-ritual, in which 
certain human beings, the actors, enact sceneries that in other human beings, the 
audience, who watch such behaviour as a mere spectacle, generate a certain illusion under 
which they take what they see as if it were real, has a crucial and socially effective role 
because it explicitly plays on and with the boundary between the everyday and the 
mysterious, and thus can alter the balance, provoking a lasting disturbance between the 
two poles of existence whose harmonious balance is fundamental for the possibility of 
having a meaningful life. 
 The term theatropoiesis was introduced in order to capture such effects produced 
by theatre, and ‘poetry’ in general. It is influenced by Heidegger’s ideas about technology 
and poetry, the connections perceived between the two that much puzzled him 
throughout his works. In Greek poiesis simply means the making of any artificial object; 
and the puzzle concerns the possible connections between the artificial evocation of an 
imagined world, characteristic of works of poetry, and the similarly artificial 
subordination of human beings into the ‘standing reserve’, so that they could become 
available to perform operations as required by the technological machinery. In other 
terminology, it implies a critical distance from neo-Kantian constructivism – an approach 
with which Heidegger was profoundly familiar, given his time spent in Marburg and the 
exchange of ideas with Natorp. Neo-Kantianism, of which the ‘social constructionism’ 
rampant in contemporary sociology is a step-child, through Berger and Luckmann, 
simply and naively asserts the cognitivist perspective that the world is a ‘construct’ of our 
intellect – an approach that ignores and thus in a way destroys the mystery of existence. 
By introducing the term theatropoiesis my intention was to signal that the very condition of 
possibility of constructivism, whether Kantian, neo-Kantian or social, was a prior 
‘theatricalisation’ of the world, among others through the universalization of the position 
of spectators into the epistemology of the ‘subject’ of knowledge possessing a 
‘transcendental mind’ on the one hand, and the moralising perspective of the public 
sphere on the other. 
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 The question now is to understand how theatrical performances exert such 
effects on the reality of human existence; and how these can be properly studied. For 
this, I start by offering a reading of the motto selected from W.H. Auden. 
The intrusion of the poetic 
 
In order to understand Auden’s text, we must start by its context. Concerning the 
valorisation of context, Bakhtin is particularly illuminating, in contrast to structuralism 
and constructivism, but also to semiotics and Derrida. An utterance cannot be studied in 
isolation: ‘[i]t always presupposes utterances that precede and follow it […] Each is only 
a link in the chain, and none can be studied outside this chain’ (Bakhtin 1986: 136). But 
this chain cannot be reduced merely to other utterances, or even the concrete historical 
setting, but must include a much broader horizon. The late fragments of Bakhtin are as 
much fragmentary as the sayings of Heraclitus, but contain just as much wisdom: ‘The 
narrow historical horizons of our literary scholarship. Enclosure within the most 
immediate historical epoch. […] We explain a phenomenon in terms of its own present 
and the recent past […] We do not study literature’s preliterary embryos (in language and 
ritual). The narrow (“specialists’ ”) understanding of specifics’ (Ibid.: 139). It is only 
through the sketching of context that a text can become alive – written by a human 
being, about other human beings, to human beings: ‘The responsive nature of contextual 
meaning. Meaning always responds to particular questions. Anything that does not 
respond to something seems meaningless to us; it is removed from dialogue. […] The 
universalism of contextual meaning, its universality and omni-temporality’ (Ibid.: 145). 
 The text is from a long epic poem by Auden; his longest poem, certainly one of 
the longest poems in world history, running to about 50 pages in his to some extent 
authoritative ‘Selected Poems’ (Auden 1979: 127-75). It was also one of the most difficult 
works he ever wrote: it not only took him about a year and a half to complete (from 
August 1942 to February 1944), but he was repeatedly stalled in the process, once for as 
long a six months. Still, he considered this poem, especially its third part, entitled 
‘Caliban to the audience’, from which the quote is taken, as his best work. 
 It was also written at a very particular moment: during WWII, when Auden was 
also an émigré, as he moved in 1939 to the United States. He was also particularly 
preoccupied, since its break-out, with the war: in September 1939 he composed one of 
his most passionate works, entitled ‘September 1, 1939’ (Ibid.: 86-9), which contained a 
number of striking formulations and quasi-prophetic insights, so much so that he 
eventually forbid reprinting this poem, as he became uncomfortable with some passages. 
 The poem from which the motto is taken, however, is not directly about the war; 
it is about Shakespeare – though about Shakespeare’s The Tempest, with evident affinities 
to Auden’s own ‘tempestuous’ present, the ‘permanently liminal’ conditions of a 
particularly destructive war that seemed to last forever; but most importantly, it is about 
the nature of artistic creation, thus it contains Auden’s reflexions on his own work, on 
his profession – not about himself in a psychoanalytical sense, rather about the general 
and universal aspect of his activity as a poet.  
 
Here it gains a special importance that Auden’s choice of writing about The Tempest was 
due not simply to the theme of that play, but also the relationship its author had with 
that play, and through it with theatre in general. The Tempest, as it is well-known, was 
Shakespeare’s last play: due not to accidents, but clearly expressed authorial intentions. 
The play is closed by an Epilogue, pronounced by its protagonist, Prospero, generally 
recognised as Shakespeare’s alter ego. Its opening line presents Prospero (played by 
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Shakespeare, but as this was outside the play, so the enunciation was particularly 
personal) as deprived of all his magic powers: ‘Now my charms are all o’erthrown’; while 
its last sentence, the last sentence of Shakespeare, contains a strangely worded request for 
pardon: ‘As you from crimes would pardoned be,/ Let your indulgence set me free.’ This 
could not be read as some kind of standard trick for squeezing out applause, as 
Shakespeare really and truly left the stage, never writing and presenting another play of 
his own intention. This is a striking and unique case: Shakespeare, the greatest playwright 
of all times simply abandoned his profession at the height of his fame and powers, aged 
47 – and with his last words asks pardon for his crimes. 
 This is the context, and the problem, with which Auden is struggling in the 
middle of WWII, and which gives the full meaning of the passage chosen as motto for 
this paper; arguably the most important passage of a long and still dense poem. Now we 
can try to understand what does it mean. 
 The passage, to begin with, concerns the relationship between the reality of 
existence (shorthanded as ’the real’), and the nature of art (or ‘the poetic’); a relationship 
in which, evidently, something has gone sour. Instead of a harmonious dialogue between 
the two, a strange dialectics developed between them.2 On the one hand, this means that 
‘the real’ somehow interfered with ‘the poetic’. The word used for such interference is 
‘intrusion’, quite a strong word, implying forceful entry, thus a penetrating violation; even 
further, the figure of the ‘intruder’, as it was analysed in a classic work by F.M. Cornford, 
was a technical character in the classical comedies of Aristophanes; a kind of trickster 
figure. Auden was aware of the anthropological character of the trickster, through the 
figure of the ‘flying trickster’. 
 Yet, this intrusion, for all its violence, is declared a relatively minor issue. It only 
‘disconcerted’ and ‘incommoded’ the poetic; two terms that play down the harm implied 
by the previous word ‘intrusion’. And Auden explicitly states so: all this was just a 
‘bagatelle’, as compared to the real problem, which would happen – but the entire poem 
indicates that this is already happening, and now, as this is the central theme of the poem, 
especially its third part, devoted to the abuse of love, culminating in the most horrendous 
of all possible crimes, the raping of the Queen of Divine Love, which Caliban, presumed 
speaker in this third part, was intended to commit before Prospero managed to stop him 
in the play – thus, which ‘would’ happen if the poetic managed to intrude upon the real. 
 
Auden’s formulation carefully, and poetically, talks about what ‘would’ happen. But the 
poem is about Shakespeare, and Shakespeare certainly belongs to the past and not the 
future. What happens when the balance between ‘the real’ and ‘the poetic’ (which is to 
evoke the mystery of life and Being) is disturbed, when ‘the poetic’ intrudes into the real, 
is that reality becomes doubled over into its own copy through images, such images 
multiplying infinitely and circulated in the social body until our sense of reality, thus 
reality itself, is thoroughly undermined and destroyed. 
 The metaphor of undermining is central for the way Goethe, a figure of modern 
European culture comparable to Shakespeare, came to understand the processes which 
led to the French Revolution and the rise of the modern world in general. 
Towards the French Revolution: The Under-miners 
 
The term appears at a crucial place of Poetry and Truth, shortly after Goethe discussed his 
search for the right measure and judgment, characterising ‘critique’ and ‘satire’ as the two 
sworn enemies of right judgment and serene poetry. The word is used in a stunning way: 
he claims that shortly after he finished university and started to work in the legal 
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profession, he came to the realisation that ‘civil society’ had been ‘undermined by a 
frightful labyrinth’, visible in the destruction of entire families around him. But how 
could a society be ‘undermined’? And who are the perpetrators of such an activity? A 
second use of the word offers some clarification on this point: it was the ‘youth’ as such 
that ‘undermined’ (untergraben) itself, with his unhappiness and self-hatred, leading to ever 
more excessive, unsustainable and unacceptable demands, due to his unsatisfiable 
passions and imagined sufferings. 
 The next element concerns Goethe’s disappointment with the legal profession 
and the human beings who made their living out of the workings of the law, in particular 
the journalists around such tribunals – the kind of people whose presence and voice 
would dominate, through the French Revolution, the new Parliaments, the modern 
‘public sphere’. Far from expressing an opinion formulated from the outside, Goethe 
was one of those legal figures, joining the group, taking part of their everyday activities, 
the jokes and the drinking, though never a leader of the pack, and so over time gained his 
distance. The central reason was a vague feeling to which even from the distance of so 
many decades and at the height of being the greatest master of German language admits 
of not being able to give a proper name. In lieu of a better term he calls it an excessive 
desire for independence, which can only develop under periods of long peace, when 
one’s desires and ambitions grow out of all bounds and limits, and become combined 
with unhealthy sensitivity, in particular an exaggerated sense of justice and a search out 
for the oppressed, resulting in a chaos of government.3  
 The model for such excesses, observes Goethe, was Voltaire, in particular 
through his attacks on the family, the institution which should rather be the positive 
centre of public life, and also through his campaign against respectable figures in high 
positions, using the press, under the hypocritical mask of searching for the truth, 
resulting in the gravest error of making the public believe that it is the real judge – a true 
absurdity. The nefarious influence of Voltaire extends to his continuous mocking and 
ridiculing of whatever was held sacred – Goethe intimates that while reading Voltaire’s 
Saul he even had the desire to strangle him; which became effective when combined with 
the similar activities of Rousseau and Diderot, confusing everything and everybody. As 
they failed to present guiding models, or some higher reality, the overall result was a 
general nausea and repugnance of society itself, demonstrating that even their 
investigations were of questionable value, as they were not guided by good faith and 
sincere benevolence, the precondition of genuine research. As a result, in the legal 
profession a particularly unhealthy, cynical and sophistic mood became dominant, 
hurting Goethe’s sense of beauty and dignity, making ‘the worse effect on a young man 
who is always striving for the good’, and also undermining respect for the law. 
 A crucial aspect of Goethe’s self-overcoming concerns his attitudes to Lessing, a 
central figure of the German Enlightenment. He admitted the enormous impact 
Lessing’s Hamburg Dramaturgy, published in between 1766 and 1769, exerted on him, like 
on everyone of his generation. In fact, this work was published just when Goethe was 
17-20 years old, a liminal moment for everyone, but particularly so for Goethe as he 
started to attend university at the very early age of 16, was a theatre buff since childhood, 
and also went through a particularly difficult and long illness at the age of 19-20, in 1768-
9. The impact of Lessing, especially through the attention he called on Shakespeare, was 
resounding; however, and still, while Goethe always preserved his great admiration for 
the bard, he managed to overcome his early infatuation with Lessing.4 
 The key distancing from Lessing concerns the centre of its previous impact, the 
propagation of the theatre of Shakespeare. Once Goethe made up his mind about the 
deleterious impact of the Enlightenment, he was able to perceive where Lessing is 
coming from and what was wrong with the reading of Shakespeare he offered. He 
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perceived that his contemporaries attributed a disproportionate attention in 
Shakespeare’s plays to clowns and to the absurd; and that such erroneous perception 
could only become so widespread as it was given a first signal by Lessing, who at that 
time enjoyed unlimited respect, in his Dramaturgy. Even worse, Lessing is held 
responsible for the bad state of the German theatre, literally accused by Goethe for 
corrupting German public morals, and in a very specific way. The German, says Goethe, 
is by nature benevolent, but comedy only generates gloating (schadenfreude) and incites 
disrespect for the upper classes, where in Germany Lessing played a pioneering role with 
his Emilia Galotti and its presumed ‘unmasking’ of the higher circles – a play that 
perfectly rhymed with the ‘spirit of the times’ (a grave error for Goethe), introducing the 
new fashion that intriguers must be aristocrats, while the greatest rascals had to be 
judges, or other members of the judiciary.5 
The significance of the metaphor is also underlined by its location: it appears at a 
crucial juncture of his autobiography, where Goethe tries to capture the underlying mood 
of the period just before the French Revolution. The term implies underground 
activities, in particular the digging of tunnels under the ground, or with activity of 
mining. Strikingly, a main character of the first volume of Wilhelm Meister, Jarno, who in 
the second volume would use the name Montan (derivative of ‘mountain’), is obsessed 
with mining. Even further, the quasi-Masonic secret society of which he is a member, the 
‘Society of the Tower’, is working ‘underground’, while the term ‘labyrinth’ is 
emphatically used to characterise their activities and appearance (see Citati 1990: 115). 
 The evocative power of the metaphor, however, does not stop here. 
‘Undermining’ generates void, or emptiness, thus causing the entity ‘undermined’ to 
collapse or fold by its own weight. It is thus a way to destroy, decompose, dismantle and 
take apart, through the void; something that captures the core of Newton’s work, arch-
enemy of Goethe, who not only discovered the absolute void, but made it into the 
‘background’ of his ‘natural philosophy’ as well. Even further, as we’ll see, the void is 
explicitly associated in the Wilhelm Meister with theatre. 
 
The metaphor of undermining, however, was not limited to Goethe. It also plays a 
central role in the chapter devoted to Dostoevsky in the magisterial overview of the 
novels of the 19th century by Pietro Citati. According to Citati, in the midst of working 
on Demons, a sudden illumination came to Dostoevsky, causing him to mutate the project 
and introduce a new hero, Stavrogin, figure of ‘absolute evil’, beyond the previous 
protagonist, Piotr Verhovensky, modelled on Nechaev; an illumination which made him 
realise that the presence of evil was much more extensive than he previously imagined: 
he had to start from a much greater distance, as the entire Russian society was 
‘undermined’ (minato, see Citati 2000: 322-5). 
 Given that destruction is thus achieved by the generation of void – nothingness, 
nil, nulla or nihil – it is of considerable interest that the two path-breakers of the idea of 
nihilism were Jacobi, an old friend of Goethe and Turgenev, a model for Dostoevsky, 
jointly represent the German and Russia sources of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism – 
which, as a kind of performative speech act, eventually culminated in the two greatest 
nihilistic regimes of the 20th century, Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia. In identifying 
nihilism as a central problem of European society, novelists evidently took the lead over 
philosophers – and, more than philosophers or sociologists, they were better aware of 
the dangers such a diagnosis entails: not only one should not play with demons, but even 
identifying others playing with demons could have disastrous consequences.  
 Theatre can be a way of conjuring up demons; it can annihilate reality by copying 
it infinitely and taking away its liveliness. In order to analyse this effect mechanism, we 
must turn to novels. 
 8 
Novels of Truth 
 
The expression ‘novels of truth’ is taken from the original French title of Girard’s 1961 
book Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque (‘Romantic life and novel-like truth’). Girard 
was born in 1923, lived through WWII, during which he got in close contact with the 
French avant-garde, becoming familiar, and eventually deeply disillusioned, with the 
circle of Picasso. Shortly after the war ended he went on a scholarship to the US and 
stayed there, teaching French language and literature, though his degree was in history. 
Based on his life experiences he came to see the central dogma of modern thought, like 
the objective existence of deep-rooted desires and the autonomy of the individual subject 
as shams, at best Romantic illusions, ideologies that convince and push human beings to 
give up their life for the pursuit of chimeras that they think as their hidden, inalienable 
essences, but which only render them as pliant puppets. When studying the novels of the 
19th century he discovered the triangular nature of mimetic desire. 
 This discovery poses the question why mimetic desire became so important for 
the novelists of the 19th century, or how such desire became invested, which leads to the 
question of the role played by theatre in modern life, and eventually its origins. This is 
the problem I addresses in a recent book, where I discussed the re-birth of theatre in 
Europe, and the intimate connections between this process and the rise of the modern 
world (Szakolczai 2013). It showed that the rebirth of theatre, in the particular form of 
comedy or Commedia dell’Arte that happened at the end of the Renaissance was not simply 
a rediscovery of a happy form of entertainment, after the ‘dark’ Middle Ages, but took 
place at a particularly liminal moment of European history, sparked in particular by the 
collapse of the Byzantine Empire and the escape of mimes and sophists to Europe, 
mostly through Cyprus and Venice, effecting a profound transformation of European 
culture that could be called ‘commedification’ or ‘theatricalisation’. This means that while 
the human world is certainly not a theatre, it can become transformed through the regular 
and routinized performance of mere spectacles. Even further, following cues from 
Agnew (1986), such a development was closely connected to the birth of modern 
capitalism whose roots, just as the roots of theatre, can be traced back to the fairground. 
The question is how to render evident that a certain society has become 
theatricalised.  
 
It was clear from the very start that the main tools available for such an analysis, 
sociology and philosophy, were strikingly unsuited for this task. Philosophy came into 
being, with the Greeks, in order to analyse reality, in opposition to mythology and 
religious metaphysics, a purpose that was repeatedly renewed, in an ever more intensive 
and excessive manner, desperately trying to reject all and any association with 
metaphysics. Yet, paradoxically, the more philosophy pretended to be concerned only 
and purely with reality, with facts and logic, nothing else, the more it became 
constitutionally unable to distinguish between the different layers, levels and modes of 
reality – in particular, to distinguish between the genuine and the fake within the real. 
Such a failure is particularly striking, as the fountainhead of rational thinking, Plato 
created philosophy just in order to be able to separate being from non-being, enabling 
him to treat the strange pseudo-reality of non-being, conjured up into existence by the 
Sophists, and – towards the end of his life – even identified the central problem of his 
contemporary Athens, the reason for the collapse of democracy, as a ‘base theatrocracy’ 
(Szakolczai 2013). Modern philosophy, desperately trying to liberate itself from all 
metaphysics, in particular the presumed ‘metaphysical idealism’ of Plato, 6  is thus 
thoroughly betraying its own original task – a task that has huge contemporary relevance, 
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given that the crisis of democracy in our days is much due for the same reasons – the 
emergence of a modern, but similarly base, ‘theatrocracy’. 
 The problem is strikingly similar with sociology. Sociology is the par excellence 
modern social science, the science of modernity, which came into being for the single 
purpose of analysing the new kind of reality that came into being after the French 
Revolution. For similar reasons it also explicitly rejected all previous forms of knowledge, 
arguing that the analysis of this new reality required radically new methods, for which 
witnessing events and contemplating their causes and consequences was not sufficient, 
rather required the systematic, meticulous collecting of facts, making full use of the tools 
offered by the modern ‘natural’ sciences and technology. Yet, if the hypothesis 
concerning theatricalisation is correct, this entire project is thoroughly misdirected, a 
blind alley, as it is exactly the accumulation of ‘mere facts, nothing but facts’ that 
prevents the proper recognition and analysis of the falsification of the real. Such 
recognition is not even new, as can be traced back at least to Dickens’ Hard Times.7 
Mainstream sociology, with its fact-mongering and number-crunching, but also 
interviewing and discourse-analysis, with its desperate collection and accumulation of 
facts, is a sophisticated enterprise to hide the most important, genuine problems of a 
theatricalised world, which – with its reification of the apparently real – only offers 
legitimacy to the fake. No approach is doing it more thoroughly and purposefully than 
the current fad concerning the ‘social construction of reality’; while critical theory, by 
increasingly committing itself to building up a normative discourse connected to the 
presumably straightforward utterances pronounced on the ‘public sphere’, ignores the 
plain fact that the public primarily is the realm of masked games, therefore it is highly 
problematic, not to say naïve, to take public utterances at a face value as a principle. 
 
The suggestion, therefore, is that the best way to analyse such a theatricalised reality, 
indeed a ‘royal road’, is offered through novels. In-depth analyses of a theatricalised 
world are contained in major classic works by Goethe, Dickens and Dostoevsky, while 
the theme becomes dominant, though still as if under the surface, in the works of 
Thomas Mann and Franz Kafka written just around WWI, when the carnival turned 
apocalyptic, just as Nietzsche and Dostoevsky predicted it would happen. The diagnosis 
of ‘carnivalisation’ became explicit in a select group of 20th century novels and stories, in 
particular ‘Carnival’ by Karen Blixen, Master and Margarita by Mikhail Bulgakov, and 
Carnival by Béla Hamvas; sharing, apart from theme – and even title – the peculiar 
destiny that none of them was published in the lifetime of its author, though for Blixen 
this was a matter of choice, while for Bulgakov and Hamvas a part of their fate. 
Concerning Blixen, who can be considered as a main representative of the most extreme 
kind of Romanticism that she managed to overcome by herself,8 the composition of the 
short story accompanied her literally throughout her entire life. The works of Hamvas 
and Bulgakov, on the other hand, can be considered, without much of a doubt, as the key 
novels for their respective times and places – Hungary, Russia, indeed of the world of 
‘existing socialism’ and the entire socialist-communist dreamland in general. Yet, and 
without denying the vast difference between them, taken together they singularly 
demonstrate something quite fundamental: that the modern world, in its utter and 
desperate seriousness about itself, the supposed progress and unlimited benefits it is 
supposed to bring to mankind, through its capitalist market economy (the ‘fairground 
capitalism’), its mass democratic state (the ‘public arena’), and its technologised science 
(the ‘infernal megamachine’), cannot possibly face the most fundamental truth about 
itself: that its core is a fake sacrificial carnival. 
Fortunately, there is also a select group of master-thinkers who advance that idea 
that novels offer a unique way to analyse the modern world: they include René Girard, 
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Michel Foucault, José Ortega y Gasset, Roberto Calasso, Pietro Citati, Mikhail Bakhtin, 
and Béla Hamvas. 
For their own cultural landscape, these figures are not just representative, rather 
outright emblematic or symbolic; torchbearers of their times and places, comparable to 
the way this applies to most of the novelist discussed. This is certainly true of Michel 
Foucault, Professor of the Collège de France and one of the best-known intellectual in a 
country of famous intellectuals; but also of René Girard, another of the main French 
master thinkers and member of the French Academy. It also applies to Ortega y Gasset, 
simply the most famous Spanish philosopher of the 20th century, who furthermore 
explicitly and repeatedly reflected on the nature of Spanish culture and Spanish identity. 
Something very similar can be said about the two Italian scholars selected, Pietro Citati 
and Roberto Calasso, each of them working and publishing since half a century, and 
recognised as iconic figures in Italian culture. In 2005 selected works of Citati, running to 
nearly 2000 pages, were published by Mondadori in a series devoted to classics, with no 
precedent of publishing such a collection by a living author; while Calasso published in 
2007 the seventh volume of a book series, a unique undertaking in the contemporary 
intellectual life. Finally, mutatis mutandis, the same can be said about Mikhail Bakhtin and 
Béla Hamvas. There were important social scientists, psychologists, linguists and 
philosophers working in the former Soviet Union that came to be known and respected 
abroad, but arguably the work of none had either the scope or the resonance as that of 
Bakhtin, whose work furthermore explicitly elucidated and reflected upon Russian 
identity; and similarly, in Hungary – but with the exception of Jan Patocka in the entire 
former Communist block – no author’s work can be compared, by sheer size, extent and 
depth to the work produced by Béla Hamvas, who furthermore again and repeatedly 
reflected upon the nature of Hungarian culture. Thus, while no exclusivity is claimed for 
these seven figures, they are not just any thinkers selected to fit a preconceived schema. 
 Yet, at the same time, each and every one of them had to face a quite strong 
hostility, even animosity due to the manner in which their work went against the 
dominating political and intellectual ideologies of their time and place, often forcing 
them to into silence or exile, willed or imposed, internal or external. Michel Foucault 
spent a large amount of his life outside France, not being able to tolerate the suffocating 
character of Parisian intellectual life, dominated by Jean-Paul Sartre and in general 
Communist leftism. René Girard also left France after WWII, while Ortega y Gasset 
spent decades outside Spain, due to his hostility to both right and left wing ideologies. 
The marginal status is most visible for the East Europeans, Bakhtin and Hamvas, as their 
work was not only opposed, but occasionally even their life was in danger. Finally, in 
spite of their status in Italian intellectual life, Citati and Calasso were both outside of and 
hostile to the main currents of Italian culture and politics, official Catholicism and 
Communist Marxism, and mostly also stayed outside Italian academic life; respected and 
feared, but also intensely disliked, and not having the chance for disciples. 
The logic of novels of truth 
 
So how do novels of truth reveal the theatricalisation of the modern world? In this 
section I will shortly sketch the mechanism, and then illustrate it through the example of 
Goethe. 
The first step of the argument is that theatre not simply represents or illustrates 
but invests and outright infects reality with certain modes of conduct and mentality – for 
e.g., omnipresent mimetic desire, jealousy, envy, occasionally even hatred. Second, this 
effect mechanism is multiplied by novels which, through the printing press, spread it 
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beyond the time and space of the theatre, bringing it even to the home; a mechanism of 
which the first examples were the chivalry romances of the early 16th century. Critical 
novelists, and critical theorists in general, perceive that something is going wrong, but 
instead of identifying the entire process, rather consider the form of behaviour invested 
as the underlying ‘truth’ of the human condition and champion the free and unrepressed 
reign of such desires in the name of human autonomy. Novelists of truth, however, 
make a further step back, even from their own selves, recognising their contribution to 
the process, and come to analyse the very mechanism by which desires are invested and 
circulated. Early and particularly important examples include Cervantes, culminating in 
Don Quixote, and Shakespeare, who in Othello identified himself with the figure of Iago, 
the most diabolical trickster figure of his plays, who invested Othello with jealousy – 
though also with Othello, mask of Harlequin, thus considering the playwright, himself, as 
both perpetrator and victim (Szakolczai 2013: 224-7). 
 As another example, let me shortly present Goethe as a novelist of truth. 
Goethe as a novelist of truth 
 
Goethe made his name by becoming unrivalled protagonist of German sentimentalism 
with his first novel, The Sufferings of the Young Werther. The novel would not only bring 
public success to Goethe, but an invitation to Weimar, which – paradoxically – enabled 
Goethe to escape public limelight, even though much of his subsequent life would be 
lived under the shadow of this work, especially until his escape to Italy in 1786, shortly 
after his 37th birthday; and even Napoleon, to Goethe’s great consternation, would be 
interested in 1806 in nothing else but Werther. Still, to some extent already in Werther, and 
even more in the first version of Wilhelm Meister, Goethe’s concern was already slightly 
more than to express this mood: also to signal its problematicity, and the ways of 
overcoming it. Goethe’s aim was not simply the evocation of sentiments, but the 
overcoming of an experience of suffering (Hadot 2008: 203), something also elaborated 
in the Prometheus fragment (Saul 2002: 27-8), and discussed in detail in Poetry and Truth. 
 The ‘Prometheus’ fragment, composed in 1773, just as Werther, also expresses 
Goethe at its most subjective, precocious, and titanic. Goethe fully identifies himself with 
the hubris of the Titan, and – as Kerényi perceptively analyses – the fragment is saturated 
with the use of the first person singular (Kerényi 1991). As compared to these two early 
works, Goethe takes a step back in the first version of the Wilhelm Meister, entitled 
Wilhelm Meister’s Theatrical Mission, draft of the future model book of the ‘novel of 
formation’ (Bildungsroman), composed in the first decade he spent in Weimar. 
 The fact that Goethe wrote a first version of Wilhelm Meister by that strange title 
was not known until December 1909, when the manuscript, which in the analogy of the 
Ur-Faust could be called the Ur-Wilhelm Meister, was accidentally discovered in Zürich. 
While the discovery was accidental, the long latency of the manuscript was certainly not. 
The handwriting was not by Goethe but by Barbara Schulthess, one of his female 
correspond-dent friends; so it is reasonable to assume that Goethe must have 
purposefully destroyed all the copies he could lay a hand to. He did not want posteriority 
to know that he originally considered the theatre as the very ‘model’ for the formation of 
the soul of the human being. His ideas certainly changed considerably later, as the two 
Wilhelm Meister novels, especially Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, but to some extent also 
Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years, are stunning documents of the theatricalisation of 
modern Europe, illustrating the thesis that the best artists are also most perceptive 
reflexive social theorists. 
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At the start of the novel matters of education and theatrical ‘mission’ are tightly 
articulated upon each other, though in the final version Goethe marks their distance by 
subtle but evident nuances. This is particularly visible in the consciously exaggerated sen-
timentalism of the novel, or the manner in which fate punishes those who live according 
to such theatrical ideals. Another clearly marked problem concerns the manner in which 
theatre can be, and was then, used to elicit nationalistic feelings. This was a particularly 
German problem, as – of all countries of Europe – ‘[i]t was in Germany that the theatre 
proved to be the strongest focus for national sentiment in the eighteenth century’ 
(Brown 1995: 289). In a scene of Book II, Chapter 10, Goethe shows how the presen-
tation of a play, written in order to elevate feelings of patriotism, succeeds so well that in 
a completely innocuous situation the normal everyday audience, out of their sheer 
happiness of being Germans, proceed to break the glasses, damage the furniture, and end 
in a drunken brawl, leading Wilhelm Meister to reflect upon how ‘bad effects can a well-
intentioned poetic work produce’ (Goethe 1869, XVIII: 79). The analytical power and 
socio-historical significance of Goethe’s work becomes all the clearer if we compare 
these events to the itinerant circus show and its effects, taking place shortly before 
(Ch.4). There Goethe analyses in minute details the trick-ful effect mechanism of such 
shows, starting with the clown and the female soubrette, behaving in a manner that 
members of the public want to become acquainted with them; continuing with pro-
voking the most different but equally intensive emotions through showing excesses like a 
deformed child, in order to evoke pity, or acrobats and tight-rope walkers, to evoke ad-
miration and fear; and then ending with the entry of the main stars who enact a love 
story through tricks of seduction, spinning further the incited desires of the audience, so 
that the enthusiasm of the public would spread contagiously, with all men lustfully 
watching the female actor, and all women the male (Ibid.: 60). The stunning, and highly 
Platonic, conclusion is that the most high-minded presentation of a national theatre uses 
the same technique, having identical aims, as an ambulant circus show: to incite emotions 
in the spectators. Thus, considering the importance that the issue of ‘national theatre’ 
assumed in Germany, largely due to the works of Lessing, singular fountainhead of the 
German obsession with ‘critique’ as well, one can argue that the excessive emotionality 
and violence of German nationalism has less to do with some presumed German 
‘historical national character’, and more with the particularly sudden and strong theatrica-
lisation of German society in the direction of ‘national theatre’; a direction that could 
exert such an overwhelming effect due to the previous, excessively Puritanical religiosity 
which – through its inhuman rejection of normal human emotions and pleasures – ren-
dered the populace incapable to resist the sudden and contagious spread of fake emoti-
onality. The parallel is particularly strong with the US of our days, where an originally 
even more markedly Puritanical society has become, over long decades, thoroughly and 
haplessly theatricalised through Hollywood, television, video and the internet.9 
In the same spirit, the novel also contains a series of explicit negative judgments 
on theatre and a theatricalised society. These start with the initial love-story, of the most 
trivial kind, as Wilhelm Meister falls in love with an actress, herself torn, as an almost 
inescapable professional destiny, between her true love and the man who is paying her 
bills; and continues through the tragic story of Therese who – as a stunning 
condemnation of her own mother – flares up against those who searched for an escape 
in books, and thus transform ‘their lives into theatre and novel’, wondering ‘how people 
could have believed that God talks to them through books and stories’ (Ibid., XIX: 120). 
The most important and direct, truly stunning and resolutely Platonic condemnation of 
theatre, however, comes from representatives of a supposedly model educational 
institution. Of all the arts theatre or drama – the two words are used interchangeably – is 
the only one that the institution does not support, as ‘it assumes a idle crowd, even a 
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mob’, set on provoking artificial feelings through ‘deceitful fun or fake pain’ (Ibid., XX: 
168). While all the arts are brothers, theatre is the single exception and prodigal son, 
which ‘would appropriate the goods of the entire family for itself, and would even waste 
this’, given that it is parasitical on them, and is their corruptor (Ibid.); even its origins are 
ambiguous (zweideutige Ursprung) (Ibid.: 169) – an expression that identifies the theatre as 
having a schismatic origin, or being literally schismogenic. These passages are followed by a 
rare explicit comment by Goethe, as if falling out of his role, presenting himself as the 
editor of these writings, and admitting that he was deeply disturbed by this strange 
passage, as he himself spent much more time on theatre than should have been proper, 
and that it was therefore difficult to convince him that all his related efforts were in vain: 
‘unpardonable errors’; ‘fruitless fatigues’ (Ibid.).  
 These comments can be further supported by a passage from his conversation 
with Eckermann, of 22 March 1825. His young interlocutor confides him that in his 
youth he not only could not miss a spectacle, but attended the rehearsals as well, and 
even visited the empty stage. Goethe offers some reasons why all young people love so 
much the theatre: ‘[n]o one asks you any questions; you need not open your mouth 
unless you choose; on the contrary, you sit quite at your ease like a king, and let 
everything pass before you, and recreate your mind and senses to your heart’s content’ 
(Goethe 1850: 214-5). Goethe shows understanding about the youth, but pitiless 
concerning the lasting effects of an infatuation with theatre. 
 Those still not convinced about the metaphorical and real void generated 
through theatricalisation, a genuine source of nihilism, should read carefully one of the 
most significant and direct reflections by Goethe, through Wilhelm Meister, on the 
lasting effect of a preoccupation with the theatre – which is the nothing, or the nulla (see 
Horvath 2010). Reflecting back on his years spent in pursuit of his ‘theatrical mission’, at 
the start of Book VII, thus the first chapter added to the book in 1795-6, Wilhelm 
Meister melancholically states that ‘when thinking back on the times that I spent with the 
theatre, I think I only see an infinite void; nothing remained of the whole thing’ (Goethe 
1869, XIX: 95). 
The indestructible 
 
Are we faced with an irresistible and complete theatricalisation of our everyday 
existence? Will the dominance of the modern, technical business world be complete?10 Is 
there no hope beyond the coming nihilism and its thorough destruction of the very 
condition of possibility of meaningful existence? The situation is certainly grim, but 
‘where danger is great, the saving power is always near’ (Hölderlin), and a particularly 
bright ray of hope is offered in the most unlikely of places – the Nachlass of Kafka. 
 It is well known that a significant part of Kafka’s work remained unpublished, 
even dispersed in diaries, notes and letters; however, strikingly nobody paid any attention 
to a booklet where Kafka carefully copied and numbered 109 aphorisms, written down 
when he spent some months – presumably the happiest period of his existence – in the 
mountain village of Zürau, during late 1917 and early 1918; quite an important period in 
‘world historical’ sense as well. These notes, buried in the Critical Edition, were selected 
for a carefully edited publication by Roberto Calasso, not only in Italian but also English 
and German, and contain – according to Pietro Citati as well – not simply the philosophy 
but the theology of Kafka. Their central word, only ever used by Kafka in this work, is 
the indestructible. 
 The term is contained in four aphorisms (No-s 50, 69, 70/1, and 74), but its 
study should start by aphorism 64, a crucial aphorism discussing a central theme of the 
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booklet, the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, in a particularly theatrical manner, and 
concluding in an astonishing claim. Its starting idea, the eternity of the expulsion from 
the Paradise, is quite depressing; but Kafka, a good student of Nietzsche’s genealogy, 
implies that no historical event can represent a complete break. From a single, once-for-
all event expulsion thus becomes a process; it is this process that is eternal. If this is so, 
then it also means that something in us is still preserved from the Paradise; and thus, in 
so far as this is with us, we are still in the Paradise, whether we take cognisance of this or 
not. Thus, through a series of cryptic, machinegun-like claims, Kafka’s inexorable ‘logic’ 
leads us from utter hopelessness into an almost blissful state. 
 But the nature of whatever is preserved in us is still to be ascertained. This is 
named as the indestructible (unzerstörbar), central term of Kafka’s philosophico-theology. In 
aphorism 50 it carries an emphatic meaning: it is simply impossible to live without a trust 
or belief (Vertrauen) that within us there is something indestructible, even if both 
(meaning the indestructible and belief in its existence) might be hidden from us. One 
modality of such belief is belief in a personal god. 
 The term then appears in two subsequent aphorisms, No-s 69 and 70/71, leading 
up to aphorism 74, which is something of a culmination of the booklet, and thus of 
Kafka’s thought. The first two clarify further the substance of this element of the Golden 
Age that has been preserved in us. No.69 offers a definition of not simply happiness, but 
the perfect possibility of happiness, or the way to happiness (and we should not forget that 
the first aphorism started with the question of the ‘true way’), as belief in this indest-
ructible in us, not the attempt to reach it. The meaning of ‘reaching’ is not fully clear 
here, but the contrast is clearly connected to the possibility of an unconscious presence 
in us, alluded to in both 50 and 64, and is thus a clear valorisation of faith or belief over 
knowledge, exactly concerning the single most fundamental part of being human. 
 A potentially important step to understanding Kafka’s meaning is offered in a 
1920 letter to Brod, in which the aphorism is quoted almost in full, except that the word 
‘indestructible’ is replaced by the expression ‘decisively divine’ (Calasso 2006: 334). The 
meaning, however, according to Calasso, even in this way remains inaccessible. It is 
evidently connected to a sense of immortality associated with certain types of acting, 
close to the sense of being alive, but we can’t go beyond a mere hypothesis; and ‘perhaps 
it is better that it is so’ (Ibid.: 335). 
 The next aphorism, No. 70/1 completes the path towards the bringing together 
of the two key terms of the aphorisms, defining the heart of Kafka’s philosophico-
theology, Paradise and the indestructible, by defining, in terms clearly recalling Plato’s 
Philebus, thus the very heart of Plato’s philosophy, the indestructible as being at the heart 
of what makes us human and social, thus the heart of the anthropology and sociology of 
the Golden Age, or whatever of it is remained is us. In this case it is necessary to offer a 
full citation: ‘The indestructible is one; every single human being is so and it is at the 
same time common to all, thus the connection between human beings is indissoluble like 
nothing else’ (No.70/71).11 
 Aphorism 74 offers the last take on the indestructible, and the first and only joint 
discussion of ‘Paradise’ and the ‘indestructible’. We should start by noticing that here, 
and here alone, the term appears as an adjective, and not as a gerund. The aphorism 
directly, though only hypothetically, connects the Fall and the indestructible: if whatever 
that was destroyed was destructible, this does not matter. If, however, the ‘indestructible’ 
was destroyed, then we have a big problem, as all our convictions are wrong. This, 
however, again by definition cannot be true – as the ‘indestructible’, if it was truly 
indestructible, could not have been destroyed. The Golden Age, not just as a possibility 
but also as a reality, inside us, is thus still given – it is a gift: our most precious gift. 
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Notes 
 
1 Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, so central for the rise of the modern novel, is a 
classic elaboration of this point. 
2 On the difference between dialogue and dialectic, see again Bakhtin. 
3 There is a remarkable similarity between this attitude and that of Don Quixote, out 
looking for adventure, but at the same time also desperately in search of widows and 
orphans who need him to be saved, confirmed by the manner in which the Romantics 
recognized in a – distorted – image of Don Quixote their own predecessor. 
4 Even according to Dilthey, who much respected Lessing, Goethe managed to 
overcome Lessing’s abstract thinking and the imposition of a ‘good taste’ that did not 
take into account the power of life (Dilthey 1986: 236). 
5 Note that for Goethe the real ‘villains’ were not the judges, rather the lawyers and 
journalists. 
6 Neo-Kantianism, in particular Natorp, played even here a singularly important role. 
Natorp was obsessed with demonstrating the identity between Plato and Kant, which 
influenced Heidegger in attributing an excessive importance to the Presocratics over 
Plato, failing to recognize the significance of Plato’s advancing in thought. 
7 The memorable starting sentences of the book are ‘what is want is, Facts. Teaching 
these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life’. 
8 Significantly, in the otherwise excellent book by Martin Green (1986) this is not 
realised, as she is considered as mere symptom of the ‘commedic’. 
9 About the impact of mass culture, through the ‘marriage’ of art, technology and 
commerce, is discussed in the excellent book by Peter Hall (1998: 503-4, 603). 
10 In this regard notw the title of a book that became the Bible of contemporary 
marketing: ‘The experience economy: work is theatre & every business a stage’. 
11 By now it becomes clear that Kafka’s ‘indestructible’ is the same as the ‘invincible 
exigency of human nature’ identified by Camus as the ‘secret’ of the Mediterranean 
world, which the ‘historical absolutism’ of ‘German ideology’, driven by action 
transformed into ‘pure conquest’, could not defeat (‘une exigence invincible de la nature 
humaine dont la Méditerrannée […] garde le secret’ (Camus, L’homme révolté, 1951: 370).)  
